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1 .  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
1 . 1 .  THE  R E SE A R CH P R OJE CT  
The primary aim of the three-year long project ‘Novelties of Criminal Law in Legal 
Consciousness’ was to map the knowledge and opinions of everyday people towards criminal 
law including regulatory novelties by means of a questionnaire-based survey. 
The questions were related to 12 criminal law topics which are more commonly encountered 
in everyday life and in the media. These ranged from the age of criminal responsibility in 
crime against property, through cruelty to animals, to the acceptance of gratuity. 
In the course of the choice of the subject, the primary selection criterion – in line with the 
objective of the research – was that the criminal law regulations on the given topic have 
changed in the last decade(s). Within this, we have chosen topics which the population 
encounters more often in everyday life and that appear more frequently in the media. Thirdly, 
we also took into consideration to be able to fall in line with previous Hungarian research 
(mainly Kulcsár and Sajó’s research), so that we would be able to measure not only the 
awareness of changes in criminal law, but also the change in legal knowledge.  
There were two to four questions related to each topic (in proportion to the complexity of the 
regulation) which related to the criminal judgement of a well-defined case. One of the cases 
always concerned a regulatory element the legal judgement of which had changed. However, 
we also asked a question or more about a ‘control case’ which measured the knowledge of an 
element the regulation of which remained unchanged. 
Respondents always had to answer a pair of questions for each case. In one respect, they had 
to decide whether or not the act described was criminalisable. Furthermore, they were also 
able to give an answer whether or not they would have declared the act a criminal offence, if 
they were the legislators. 
 
1 Closed on 03 March 2020. Elaborated within the framework of the project ‘Novelties of criminal law in 
legal consciusness’ NKFIH no. 125378, implemented in the Social Sciences Research Centre, Institute of 
Law between 2017-2020 
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The questionnaire was conducted between 12 and 17 October 2018 – with the involvement of 
a public opinion research company (Median Public Opinion and Market Research Institute) – 
on a nationwide sample representative of the adult Hungarian population. The data collection 
took place at the respondents’ apartment, using a structured questionnaire, within the 
framework of omnibus data collection. The interview was conducted under the supervision 
and assistance of the interviewer, using a self-completion procedure on a sample of 1,200 
people representing the adult population (over 18 years of age) in the country.2 
1 . 2 .  SUB JE CT M A TTE R  OF  THE  STUDY 
 
Regarding active bribery of public officials, respondents were asked to pass their judgement 
on the following two cases:  
1. Someone presents a gift worth HUF 30,000 to the public official when he or she 
applies for permission to run a buffet at a government office. 
2. Someone presents a gift worth HUF 30,000 to the public official after he or she has 
received the permission from the government office to run a buffet. 
The second of these situations concerns a regulatory novelty, since based on the Criminal 
Code, the granting of an advantage to an official afterwards (and without the intention of 
further influencing) no longer constitutes a criminal offense.3 
 
2.  C R I M I N A L  L A W  A N D  P R A C T I C E 
In the following, we review how our criminal law regulated active bribery of public officials 
at the time of previous similar research (in the early 1960s) and at the times relevant in respect 
of this present research (in 2008 and in 2018, respectively). 
2 . 1 .  ACT  V OF  196 1 
Based on Act V of 1961 (the Criminal Code of 1961), (among other things) a person who 
‘gives or promises to an official person or through him to someone else, in connection with 
his official capacity such advantage which may injuriously influence the official activity of 
the official person in regard to the public interest,’ was criminalisable.4 According to the legal 
literature, these facts may include ‘not only activities which are not related to the specific duty 
and which seek to obtain the future benevolence of the official, but also, subject to certain 
conditions, remuneration for the performance of the duty.’ (Wiener 1972 p. 303). In the 
application of this fact, the legal explanation also prevailed that ‘in addition to gaining future 
benevolence, a benefit given as a token of gratitude may have a detrimental effect on the 
public interest if the custom of presenting an official with a gift becomes well known among 
the persons concerned’. (Wiener 1972 pp. 287, 303). 
 
2 The sampling method was a multi-stage stratified random procedure. During data processing the minor 
biases in the sample resulting from the random procedure were corrected by four-dimensional weighting 
based on gender, age, education, and settlement type based on census data. The weighted data file was 
also used for the present analysis. 
3 cf. study title 4 
4  paragraph 1 of § 153 in the Criminal Code of 1961. 
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The Criminal Code of 1978 
The original regulation of the Criminal Code of 1978 also provided for the punishment of 
‘any person who gives or promises unlawful advantage to a public official or to another 
person on account of such official which may affect the official in his official capacity to the 
detriment of the public interest’.5 According to the legal literature, in respect of  this situation 
cases in which ‘when [the advantage] is granted or promised the person giving the advantage 
has no case pending or in prospect with the public official’ are relevant. The advantage is 
therefore linked to the operation of the public official through a completed act (procedure, 
measure) in which the person giving the advantage was a client’. This element thus 
emphasizes “not the purpose of the person giving the advantage, that is to say, a subjective 
motive belonging to the actor’s aspect, but the objective specificity of the advantage: Namely, 
how the promise and/or granting of the advantage in time relates to the official connection 
between the public official and the person giving the advantage’.6 
Act CXXI of 2001 amended the regulations set forth in the Criminal Code of 1978, so that the 
culpable person was ‘any person who gives or promises unlawful advantage to a public 
official or to another person on account of such official’. This basic case of active bribery 
could also be established (to the extent relevant to our study) “if the giving or promising of an 
advantage occurs after the substantive completion of the case, without the prospect of the 
opening of another case”.7 
2 . 2 .  T HE  CRI MI NA L C ODE  
Under Act C of 2012 (the Criminal Code), official bribery is effectuated by anyone who 
“attempts to bribe a public official by giving or promising unlawful advantage”. Pursuant to 
the ministerial justification of the proposal in the Criminal Code, ‘the legislator thus indicates 
that […] the purpose of the advantage is to influence the public official’.8 The new legal facts 
thus constitute an intentional criminal offence (Sinku 2012, p. 435). 
The Supreme Court of Justice also noticed that the legislator […] changed the regulation in 
two places. In one respect, the Criminal Code attaches importance to temporality and, 
contrary to the timeless, prevailing expectation of the previous law, excluded the conduct 
remunerating or compensating an official operation already completed in the past 
subsequently (however, without and precursory promise) and limited the prohibition of the 
criminal law only to the remuneration or compensation aiming at any current, consequently, 
ongoing, as well as future, consequently, prospective official operation. In another respect, it 
has assigned an additional intention to this and that legislative intention to be achieved, that is 
to say, an objective which, by definition, has to be proved’.9 The legislature supplemented the 
legal facts with ‘the factual element »aiming at influencing«, with an objective referring to the 
future.10 
 
5 The Criminal Code of 1978 Paragraph (1) in § 253. 
6 Bócz 1986  pp. 738-739. 
7 Vida 2005 p. 415,   
8 The justification added to § 293 of the Criminal Code. 
9 Supreme Court of Justice, Bhar. III. 396/2017., EH 2018. 13., Justification [72]. 
10 Supreme Court of Justice, Bhar. III. 396/2017., EH 2018. 13., Justification [72]. 
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The essence of the change in the act in substantive law is therefore that the granting of an 
unlawful advantage after the closure of the administration has become the subject of a 
differentiated judgement. Following the closure of the administration, the granting of an 
unlawful advantage may constitute a criminal offense or, although active but - not 
criminalisable conduct, depending on whether the intention can be established or not. Giving 
the unlawful advantage subsequently, solely by the transferor, is not a criminal offense if it 
cannot be inferred that it is provided by the client for the purpose of influencing the current or 
future activities of the public official”.11 
The ‘regulation for the crime of official bribery in the Criminal Code in force differs from the 
special partial facts of the [Criminal Code] of 1978 relating to the same criminal offenses’. 
Previously, “the transferor and acceptor of the unlawful advantage committed a criminal 
offense by the transfer of the unlawful advantage in itself without any temporal limit’.12 
Whereas, „in conformity with the […] Criminal Code, the acceptor of the unlawful advantage 
still commits a criminal offense – both in the cases of accepting the unlawful advantage 
during his or her official operation or subsequently, however, the transferor of the unlawful 
advantage only commits a criminal offense after the completion of the operation of the public 
official, if the determination for influencing the activity of the public official is proved.13  
According to a legal proposal critical to the current legislation, the intentional regulation of 
active bribery should be abolished de lege ferenda. Namely, the protection of trust in the 
functioning of the office also requires the ordering of the criminalisation of granting benefits 
that are capable of creating the appearance of influencing an official (and are therefore 
unlawful) (Hollán 2014: 81). 
3 .  R E S E A R C H  Q U E S T I O N S  A N D  H Y P O T H E S E S  
3 . 1 .  NA TUR E  A ND LE V E L OF  LE GA L KNO W LE DGE  
Based on research history, we presumed that average people also have gaps in their 
knowledge of regulating the active bribery of public officials. Compared to other criminal law 
issues, we expected a lower level of knowledge, given that these questions were aimed at an 
act the moral condemnation of which is not so clear from that of other criminal offences 
(theft, sexual violence, robbery). 
3 . 2 .  SOCI O- E CO NOM I C F A CT OR S 
Based on the professional literature, we presumed that, similarly to other criminal law issues, 
bribery would not really differ based on the usual socio-demographic variables (gender, age, 
education, type of settlement, occupation, ideological position, religiosity, financial situation, 
household composition). 
3 . 3 .  KN OW LE DGE  OF  LA TE ST  R E GULA TI ONS 
In harmony with our general research hypothesis, we also presumed in respect of active 
bribery of public officials, that the regulations which were in force earlier would be more 
well-known among people. Namely, in this respect, the respondent was more likely to have 
heard of the regulation or to have come into contact with it in some other way. 
 
11 Supreme Court of Justice, Bhar. III. 396/2017., EH 2018. 13. Summary part III, Justification [85]. 
12 Supreme Court of Justice, Bhar. III. 396/2017., EH 2018. 13., Justification [73]. 
13 Supreme Court of Justice, Bhar. III. 396/2017., EH 2018. 13., Summary part [72]. 
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4 .  A N A L Y S E S  O F  T H E  K N O W L E D G E  
4 . 1 .  A CCUR A C Y OF  KN OW LE DGE  
When asked about giving an unlawful advantage in advance, nearly half of the respondents 
(47 percent) answered (correctly) that this is criminalised by current laws. This is somewhat 
lower than the average rate of the correct answers (56 percent) for all legal knowledge 
questions. 
In comparison with this, more respondents (58 percent) knew (correctly) that it was not a 
criminal offence for someone to give a gift of HUF 30,000 to the official in charge after 
receiving permission to operate the buffet from the government office. This corresponds to 
the average of the correct answers established for the whole questionnaire. 
Table 2 
Someone presents a 
gift worth HUF 
30,000 to the clerk 
when he or she 
applies for 
permission to run a 
buffet at a 
government office. 
Is it criminalised? 
(percentage) 
 
knowledge 
is criminalised  47 
is not criminalised  51 
does not know 2 
* without those who (N=29) did not answer any of the situational 
questions 
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Table 3 
Someone presents a 
gift worth HUF 
30,000 to the clerk 
after he or she 
received the 
permission to run a 
buffet at a 
government office. 
Is it criminalised? 
(percentage) 
 
knowledge 
is criminalised  40 
is not criminalised  58 
does not know 2 
 
* without those who did not answer any of the situational questions (N=29) 
Only 11 percent of all respondents were fully informed about the current criminal law 
judgement of active bribery of public officials. 
In contrast, nearly half of the population (48 percent) know that none of the acts listed in 
relation to active bribery of public officials is a criminal offence. Conversely, the other large 
group, more than a third of the respondents (37 percent), believe that both acts are criminal 
offences. It could be established then, that those who only answered one question correctly 
(85 percent in total) actually followed a pattern: they either did not consider either situation to 
be a criminal offence or considered both to be criminal offences. 
Table 4 
Someone presents a gift worth HUF 30,000 to the clerk from whom he or she applies for 
permission to run a buffet at a government office. Is it punished? (percentage) 
 after he or she received the permission 
punished not punished 
when he or she 
applies for the 
permission 
is criminalised  37 11 
is not 
criminalised  
4 48 
* without those who answered any of the questions like ‘I do not know’. 
 
Table 5 
The different combinations of the correct answers (percentage) 
 knowledge 
they only know that it is criminalised if someone gives a gift during 37 
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the administration 
they only know that it is not criminalised if someone gives a gift after the 
administration is completed 
48 
they know both 11 
they do not know either of them 4 
TOTAL 100 
* without those who answered any of the questions like ‘I do not know’. 
 
Table 6 
Number of correct answers (percentage) 
 % 
 
none 4 
one 85 
both 11 
Total 100 
 
Only 15 per cent of respondents think that a gift given at the time of applying for a permit or 
after the permit has been granted is judged differently, so few people are aware of the 
difference in time (as assessed in the currently effective law). 
4 . 2 .  KN OW LE DGE  OF  NOV E LTI E S   
The novelty of official bribery regulation is rightly known to more people (58 per cent) than 
its unchanged element (47 per cent). However, this is presumably explained by the schematic 
nature of the responses, since four-fifths of those whose responses reflected regulatory 
novelty also said (erroneously) that the other situation would not be criminalised. 
If we look at legal knowledge in relation to the regulation of active bribery of public officials 
as a whole, there are more than three times as many respondents whose answers reflect the old 
regulation (37 per cent) than those who reflect the new one (11 per cent). However, this was 
not necessarily due to their actual knowledge of the older regulation, since the proportion of 
those who believe that neither type of act is criminalisable is even higher, at 48 percent, and 
this does not correspond to any statutory law. 
5.  A N A L Y S I S  O F  O P I N I O N S 
5 . 1 .  W I LLI NGNE S S  TO CR I M I NA LI SE  
Nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of respondents would criminalise giving unlawful 
advantage in advance if they were the legislator. Slightly less, two-thirds (67 percent) of those 
surveyed would criminalise it if presenting the gift took place after the permit was granted. 
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Table 7 
Someone presents a 
gift worth HUF 
30,000 to the clerk 
when he or she 
applies for 
permission to run a 
buffet at a 
government office. 
Should it be 
criminalised? 
(percentage) 
 
opinion 
criminalise 73 
do not criminalise  25 
does not know 2 
* without those who (N=29) did not answer any of the situational 
questions 
 
Table 8  
Someone presents a 
gift worth HUF 
30,000 to the clerk 
after he or she 
received the 
permission to run a 
buffet at a 
government office. 
Should it be 
criminalised? 
(percentage) 
 
opinion 
criminalise 67 
do not criminalise  31 
does not know 2 
 
* without those who (N=29) did not answer any of the situational questions 
5 . 2 .  CR I TI CI SM  OF  THE  LA W  I N F OR CE  
As for opinions about whether or not the active bribery of public officials is criminalisable the 
majority (63 percent) would criminalise both of the listed acts, so they agree with the 
regulations in force previously. However, the proportion of those (22 percent) who would not 
criminalise either act is not negligible, either. This also indicates that the temporality of giving 
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an unlawful advantage as assessed by statutory law, is also irrelevant to the majority (85 per 
cent) of average people in terms of their opinion. There are two and a half times as many 
respondents (who would only criminalise presenting the gift simultaneously with the 
application 11 per cent) than as many as only the presenting it subsequently (4 per cent). 
Therefore, it is the former one-tenth of the population that is in full agreement with the current 
regulations. 
Table 9 
How many of the two acts would you criminalise? (percentage) 
neither 22 
one 15 
both  63 
total 100 
 
Table 10 
The different combinations of the opinions formed on criminalisation (percentage) 
 opinion 
they would only criminalise giving a gift simultaneously 
with the application 
11 
they would only criminalise giving a gift after getting the 
permit  
4 
they would criminalise both cases 63 
they would criminalise neither case 22 
TOTAL 100 
 
6.  I N T E R A C T I O N  O F  O P I N I O N S  A N D  K N O W L E D G E  
6 . 1 .  OP I NI ON S V S .  KN OW LE DGE 
In the following, we compare people’s opinions with the world of law according to their own 
idea, primarily in order to determine the extent to which respondents are characterized by a 
critical (conformist) attitude towards perceived law. Both situations reveal the majority of 
those who know the law according to their opinion (67 percent) and a negligible (3 percent) 
proportion of those who say the law punishes something they would not punish to their hearts. 
So, there is a strong coincidence between knowledge and opinion, but we can only deduce the 
direction of the connection. According to our assumption, when we ask respondents about 
their knowledge of the current regulation it is the opinion formed about the given situation 
and its morality that may guide them instead of knowing the statutory law, in several cases. 
Scilicet for, opinions correlate most strongly with one another, then with the knowledge 
appertaining to the same situation and then with the knowledge appertaining to the other 
situation. 
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Table 11 
Pearson correlation between knowledge and opinions 
(Each correlation was statistically significant at p = 0.01 (2-tailed).) 
 
If there is a discrepancy between opinion and presumed regulation, it tends to influence 
towards criminalisation (30 percent in both situations). 
Table 12 
Opinions on criminalisation compared to presumed regulation 
(only among those who also reported on the knowledge of the given regulation and their 
opinion on it, percentage) 
 Their opinion 
agrees with the 
presumed 
regulation 
would 
criminalise  
Would 
decriminalise 
TOTAL 
Someone presents a gift 
worth HUF 30,000 to the 
clerk when he or she 
applies for permission to 
run a buffet at a 
government office. 
67 30 3 100 
Someone presents a gift 
worth HUF 30,000 to the 
clerk after he or she 
received the permission to 
run a buffet at a 
government office. 
67 30 3 100 
 when applying for the 
operation of a buffet from 
a government office 
after receiving the permit for the 
operation of a buffet from a 
government office 
knowledge opinion knowledge opinion 
when applying for 
the operation of a 
buffet from a 
government office 
knowledge 1 .419 .714 .263 
opinion .419 1 .275 .645 
after applying for the 
operation of a buffet 
from a government 
office 
knowledge .714 .275 1 .430 
opinion .263 .645 .430 1 
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6 . 2 .  CO NSI STE N CY OF  OP I NI ONS A N D K N OW LE DGE  W I TH 
A P P LI CA B LE  LA W  
Inspired by Hertogh’s model, 14 we compare opinions not only with the presumed but also 
with the actual regulation. The purpose of this is to determine to what extent the 
critical/conformist attitude of the respondents, which we have examined not only in relation to 
the law in force,15 , but also in relation to the presumed law, 16 is partly coupled with 
information or ignorance. Based on this, we find a considerable difference between the 
judgments of each situation. 
In the case of the penal code for the currently criminalisable conduct (i.e. a gift given when 
applying for a permit), the proportion (30 per cent) of those who consider it appropriate to 
order a prior claim for an advantage is criminalisable by being uninformed, i.e. (mistakenly) 
believing that it does not constitute a criminal offence in our current law. However, their 
attitude is only critical of the law they presume, but they do not actually know the law in 
force, but they actually identify themselves with it in their opinion. 
Table 13 
Someone presents a gift worth HUF 30,000 to the public official when he or she applies for 
permission to run a buffet at a government office. Is it criminalised? Should it be 
criminalised? (percentage) 
 criminalise do not criminalise  
is criminalised  45 3 
is not 
criminalised  
30 22 
* without those who answered any of the questions like ‘I do not know’. 
In terms of presenting a gift after the completion of the administration, however, nearly one-
third of the population (30 percent) is critical and also informed. They consciously want to 
criminalise this type of act, that is, by being aware of it: it is not a criminal offence at the 
moment.  
Table 14 
Someone presents a gift worth HUF 30,000 to the clerk after he or she received the 
permission to run a buffet at a government office. Is it criminalised? Should it be 
criminalised? (percentage) 
 criminalise do not criminalise  
is criminalised  38 3 
is not 
criminalised  
30 29 
 
14 We must add that Hertogh examined identification with law with more general questions of attitudes 
about law, and not with ones as to how people would behave as legislators. Cf. title 2.1.1 
15 Cf. Title 5.3 
16 Cf. Title 5.4. 
12 
 
* without those who answered any of the questions like ‘I do not know’. 
Just as many (11 per cent) judge a gift given at the time of applying for a permit or after 
receiving a permit as differently as they know that this is how the law distinguishes between 
the two situations (11 per cent), but the two groups do not include the same respondents. 
Those who know the difference correctly would largely (57 percent) treat the two situations 
differently themselves, but one-third (35 percent) would also criminalise presenting the gift 
subsequently, while 8 percent would not criminalise either case. 
Table 15 
Someone gives a gift worth HUF 30,000 to the public official. Should it be criminalised? 
(among those who correctly know the legal regulation of both situations, N = 115; percentage) 
 after receiving the permit for the operation of a buffet 
from a government office 
criminalise do not criminalise  
when applying for the 
operation of a buffet from 
a government office 
criminalise 35 57 
do not 
criminalise  
0 8 
6 . 3 .  M ULTI P LE  V A R I AB LE  A NA LYSI S 
We attempt to answer which of the opinions and socio-demographic variables contributed 
more to the evolution of knowledge using a multivariate analysis. The dependent variable of 
the binary logistic regression model was the Boolean, correct/incorrect response for each 
situation. Among the independent variables, in addition to the socio-demographic variables, 
we included the knowledge in respect of the other situation and the opinion about the given 
situation.17 
The model explained 63 percent of the standard deviation in knowledge of the regulation of 
presenting a gift simultaneously 18. The strongest influence was on the responses to the 
knowledge of the regulation presenting a gift subsequently,19, as well as the opinions formed 
about presenting a gift simultaneously20 
 
17 The following independent variables were included in the analysis: Gender (1: male; 2: female); Financial 
situation (1: better; 2: about the same as; 3: worse than other Hungarian families) Size of settlement (less 
than 1: 1000 inhabitants; 8: more than 100,000 inhabitants, 9: Budapest) Do you go to church? (1: 
several times a week; 6: do not go to church or religious gatherings at all); Do you have a job? (1: full-
time; 8: inactive earners); Size of family; Number of persons above 60; Number of children under 18; 
Per capita income; Age; Educational attainment; Do you watch the news on TV? (0: do not; 1: watch 
RTL or TV2 Híradó at least once a week); Were you involved in a criminal offence? (0: no; 1: yes); Do 
you read a daily newspaper? (1: no; 2: yes); Is presenting a gift subsequently criminalised? (1: is 
criminalised; is not criminalised); What do you think about presenting a gift SIMULTANEOUSLY? (1: 
should be criminalised; should not be criminalised) 
18 Nágelkerke R²=0.630. 
19 exp (B)=38.138 
20 exp (B)=11.070 
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In addition, going to church showed a significant (p=0.05) correlation: 21: the proportion of 
correct answers was slightly lower among churchgoers. There is a similar, weak relationship 
with the number of children under the age of 18 and age: there are slightly more correct 
answers if there is a minor in the household22, or with the advancement in age.23   
The situation was similar for presenting a gift subsequently. The model explained 67 percent 
of the standard deviation.24 The strongest influence in this case was also the answers given to 
the knowledge of the regulation about presenting a gift in advance25, as well as the opinions 
formed about presenting a gift subsequently.26 
In addition, the size of the settlement showed a significant (p=0.05) correlation: 27: the 
proportion of correct answers was slightly lower among those living in a larger settlement. 
There is also a weak relationship with education: the correct answer is somewhat more likely 
among those having better education 28, or if they have been involved in a criminal offence.29   
This analysis also confirms that the responses are mostly influenced by two factors: the 
respondents’ more schematic thinking in comparison to statutory law, and their opinion on the 
need to order the criminalisation of the act. 
7.  C H A N G E  I N  L E G A L  C O N S C I O U S N E S S  
It is worth comparing the results of our research with that of a previous similar research 
(conducted forty years ago). Based on this, we can draw conclusions not only about the 
awareness of the changes, but also about the change of the legal consciousness. In his 
research, Kulcsár asked a single question of legal knowledge 30 regarding the active bribery 
of public officials, which concerned presenting a gift subsequently. That question read as 
follows: ‘P.V. receives a housing allocation. He sends a watch to the public official out of 
gratitude. Is presenting a gift allowed in such a case? (Kulcsár 1967:40). In this respect, 
however, the fact that the criminal judgement of this type of act has also changed, as in 1965 
it was classified as a criminal offence, but it was no longer so in 2018 gives rise to a 
particularly interesting comparison.31 
In 1965, nearly eight-tenths (78 percent) of those surveyed knew (correctly at the time) that it 
was a criminal offence to give a gift for administration afterwards. By 2018, the proportion of 
 
21  exp (B)=0.776 
22  exp (B)=0.623 
23  exp (B)=0.980 
24  Nágelkerke R²=0,673 
25  exp (B)=45.138 
26  exp (B)=11.103 
27  exp (B)=0.886 
28  exp (B)=1.642 
29  exp (B)=2.510 
30 Kulcsár did not ask a question about the respondent’s personal judgement. 
31 Cf. title 2.1 and title 2.3. 
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those who think so has almost halved. Even 40 years of the population know, in accordance 
with the previous legislation (erroneously) this constitutes a criminal offence. However, the 
majority (58 percent) – in accordance with the new regulations – already know that presenting 
a gift subsequently does not constitute a criminal offence.  
However, it would be premature to conclude from this that the change in legal consciousness 
would result from the knowledge of the regulations in force since 2013 onwards. Scilicet for, 
out of this 58 percent, 48 percent gave the same (schematic) answer to presenting a gift in 
advance or subsequently: is not criminalised. That is, currently 48 percent of respondents 
mistakenly think that presenting a gift to an official either subsequently or simultaneously is 
not a criminal offence.  
Table 16 
Assessment of the lawfulness of active bribery of public officials in 1965 (Kulcsár 1967: 
Tables 53 and 66) and 2018 (percentage) 
 1965 
P.V. receives a 
housing allocation. He 
sends a watch to the 
public official out of 
gratitude. Is presenting 
a gift allowed in such a 
case? 
2018.  
Someone presents a gift 
worth HUF 30,000 to the 
clerk after he or she received 
the permission to run a 
buffet at a government 
office. Is it criminalised? 
is 
criminalised  
78 40 
is not 
criminalised  
17 58 
does not 
know 
5 2 
 
8 .  C O N C L U S I O N   
8 . 1 .  SUM M A R Y OF  R E SULTS  
With regard to active bribery of public officials, the level of legal knowledge of the 
Hungarian population is not really high on the aggregate. Very few (11 percent of the total 
sample) know correctly that presenting a gift simultaneously with applying for permission is 
criminalisable, while giving the benefit subsequently (if the purpose of further influencing is 
not present) is no longer that. In contrast, nearly half of those surveyed (48 percent) know that 
an amount of money given to a public official (if it is not intended to induce a breach of duty) 
is not a criminal offense in the cases of giving it in advance or subsequently. The other large 
group, more than a third of the respondents (37 percent), believe that these acts are criminal 
offences (regardless of the time and purpose of giving the advantage). 
However, the willingness of Hungarian society to criminalise is high even in the case of the 
active bribery of public officials. Two-thirds of respondents (63 percent) would also 
criminalise presenting a gift in advance or subsequently if they are addressed to an official 
acting or completing the case. A significant proportion of them therefore do not agree with the 
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current legislation, according to which presenting a gift simultaneously does not constitute a 
criminal offence. 
The opinion of two-thirds of the population (67 percent) agrees with what they consider to be 
regulation. Those who have a difference of knowledge and opinion would clearly criminalise: 
the proportion of those who say that active the bribery of public officials in advance or 
subsequently is not criminalised currently is just three-tenths as that of those who are of the 
opinion that it should be criminalised.  
However, a significant number of those who consider it right to penalise presenting a gift 
before the official administration are uninformed, i.e. they (mistakenly) believe that it does 
not constitute a criminal offense under our current law. In contrast, nearly one-third of the 
population (30 percent) is critical and also informed in terms of presenting a gift subsequently 
the official administration. Consequently, they consciously want to criminalise this type of 
act, that is, by being aware of it: it is not a criminal offence at the moment. 
In 1965, nearly eight-tenths (78 percent) of those surveyed knew (correctly at the time) that it 
was a criminal offence to give a gift for administration afterwards. By 2018, the proportion of 
those with such knowledge has nearly halved, with the majority (58 per cent) knowing (now 
also correctly) that presenting a gift subsequently does not constitute a criminal offence. 
However, this is presumably not primarily due to the knowledge of the change in the legal 
regulations in 2013: currently 48 percent of respondents still mistakenly think that presenting 
a gift to a public official either subsequently or simultaneously does not constitute a criminal 
offence. 
8 . 2 .  V E R I F I CA TI ON OF  HYP OTHE SE S  
Our hypotheses were only partially verified:  
Firstly: The average person also has fragmentary knowledge about the legal regulation of 
active bribery. However, this is partly due to the fact that the respondents, in comparison to 
the differentiation of the legal regulation, usually have schematic knowledge on the subject: 
according to most of them presenting the public official with a gift is either criminalised in all 
or none of the cases. 
Secondly: We practically have not been able to relate the knowledge of regulations to any 
variable which reflects the socio-economic situation. Knowledge about the criminalization of 
active bribery was much more influenced by respondents’ opinions than by socio-
demographic factors. 
Thirdly: 3. If we look at legal knowledge in relation to the regulation of active bribery of 
public officials as a whole, there are more than three times as many respondents whose 
answers reflect the old regulation (37 per cent) than those who reflect the new one (11 per 
cent). However, this was not necessarily due to actual knowledge of the older regulation, 
since the proportion of those who believe that neither type of act is punishable is even higher, 
at 48 percent, and this does not correspond to any itemized law. 
However, it works expressly against the hypotheses that the novelty of official bribery 
regulation is rightly known to more people (58 per cent) than its unchanged element (47 per 
cent). However, this is explained again by the schematic nature of the responses, since four-
fifths of those whose responses reflected regulatory novelty also said (erroneously) that the 
other situation would not be punished. 
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Abstract 
Miklós Hollán - Timea Venczel  
The criminalisation of active bribery of public officials – knowledge and opinions 
One of the objectives of the three-year project ‘Novelties of Criminal Law in Legal 
Consciousness’ was to measure the knowledge and opinion of everyday people toward 
criminal law including regulatory novelties. In this paper, the authors analyse the responses to 
questions related to active bribery of public officials. Based on these, it may be ascertained 
that the average person has a fragmented knowledge even about this sector of criminal law. 
However, this is partly due to the fact that the respondents - compared to the differentiation of 
the legal regulation - usually have schematic knowledge on the topic. It was not substantiated, 
however, that this knowledge is considerably affected by socio-economic factors or by media 
consumption. The answers given to the questions about knowledge were primarily influenced 
by the opinions of the respondents in relation to criminalisation. The knowledge of people 
reflected more the regulation in force previously than the current one. However, this was not 
necessarily due to actual knowledge of the older regulation, but rather to the fact that it was 
more in line with respondents insensitivity to legal distinctions. 
Keywords: novelties, criminal law, legal consciousness, survey, official bribery 
 
